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Abstract 
 
The current study examined how social cognition – specifically, belief-state processing – 
changes across the lifespan, using a large sample (N = 309) of participants aged 10-86 years. 
Participants completed an event-related brain potential study in which they listened to 
stories involving a character who held either a true- or false-belief about the location of an 
object, and then acted in a manner consistent or inconsistent to this belief-state. Analysis of 
the N400 revealed that when the character held a true-belief, inconsistent outcomes led to 
a more negative-going N400 waveform than consistent outcomes. In contrast, when the 
character held a false-belief, consistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 
waveform than inconsistent outcomes, indicating that participants interpreted the 
character’s actions according to their own more complete knowledge of reality. Importantly, 
this egocentric bias was not modulated by age in an early time window (200-400ms post-
stimulus onset), meaning that initial processing is grounded in reality, irrespective of age. 
However, this egocentric effect was correlated with age in a later time window (400-600ms 
post-stimulus onset), as older adults continued to consider the story events according to 
their own knowledge of reality, but younger participants had now switched to 
accommodate the character’s perspective. In a final 600-1000ms time window, this age 
modulation was no longer present. Interestingly, results suggested that this extended 
egocentric processing in older adults was not the result of domain-general cognitive 
declines, as no significant relationship was found with executive functioning (inhibitory 
control and working memory). 
 
Key Words: Social Cognition; False Beliefs; Belief-Attribution; Event-Related Brain 
Potentials; Ageing 
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1. Introduction 
 
The ability to understand other people’s mental states – in terms of their motivations, 
beliefs, desires, and knowledge states – plays a critical role in daily life, allowing successful 
interactions to occur. These ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) abilities are key predictors of successful 
social outcomes; individuals who report difficulties in their ToM abilities often report 
impairments in social interactions, both in clinical populations (e.g., Baron-Cohen, et al., 
1985; Couture, Penn, & Roberts; Frith, 2001), and also in typical human aging (e.g., Bailey, 
Henry, & von Hippel, 2008; Moran, 2013; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004). Whilst there has been 
much empirical work on social cognition abilities, it remains unclear how these social 
cognition capacities are utilized in our daily lives, and, importantly, the extent to which 
these abilities change or remain stable across the lifespan. The current study examined the 
electrophysiological basis of tracking other peoples’ (false) beliefs and integrating events 
according to those beliefs (i.e., understanding events from another person’s perspective). 
Specifically, we tested whether and how belief-attribution capacities change across the 
lifespan in a large sample (N=309) of participants aged 10-86 years old, and examined 
whether these changes reflect domain-general declines in cognitive skills (e.g., executive 
functions), versus domain-specific changes in social cognition. 
Recent research has shown that the social brain continues to develop throughout 
adolescence (Blakemore & Mills, 2014; Dumontheil, 2016), and that these structural 
changes underlie major developmental progressions in social cognition, which interact with 
improvements in cognitive control (Humphrey & Dumontheil, 2016; Mills, Dumontheil, 
Speekenbrink, & Blakemore, 2015). At the other end of the age spectrum, older adults 
experience greater difficulties in engaging ToM abilities compared to younger adults (Bailey 
& Henry, 2008; Castelli et al., 2010; German & Hehman, 2006; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 
2007). For instance, older adults have been shown to be impaired compared to younger 
adults in their ability to recognize emotions (Grainger, Henry, Phillips, Vanman, & Allen, 
2015), attribute mental states to story characters (Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, & Taylor, 
2002), and switch from their own to someone else’s perspective (Martin et al., 2019). The 
social consequences of difficulties with ToM can be severe, limiting social-communicative 
abilities, which in turn can lead to feelings of loneliness and depression, particularly in later 
life (e.g., Bailey et al., 2008; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004). Further, it has been shown that ToM 
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abilities predict social functioning outcomes across the neurotypical human lifespan, 
highlighting the importance of furthering our understanding of how ToM changes and 
develops across the lifespan (Schneider, Slaughter, & Dux, 2017; Apperly, Samson, & 
Humphreys, 2009; Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2020; Phillips et al., 2011). Whilst 
prior studies have aimed to localise the underlying mechanisms of ToM capacities using 
neuroimaging or source localisation methods (e.g., Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Kang, Schneider, 
Schweinberger, & Mitchell, 2018; Vogeley et al., 2001), it remains largely unknown how 
these social cognitive mechanisms may change across the healthy lifespan, and how this 
may be reflected in temporally sensitive neuroimaging measures, such as event-related 
potentials. Results ascertained from healthy, neurotypical adults can significantly further 
our understanding of ToM processes, including advancing our understanding of the neural 
changes associated with ToM processes across the lifespan, and how social changes during 
different stages of life may impact – or be impacted by – ToM engagement.  
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) proposed a distinction between explicit and implicit 
ToM, where implicit ToM refers to automatic tracking of an agent’s perspective, and explicit 
ToM refers to deliberate consideration of an agent’s mental states. In other words, explicit 
ToM involves an individual purposefully and deliberately reasoning about others’ beliefs, 
whereas implicit ToM, which is argued to exist alongside the explicit mental state tracking 
system, involves processing of another person’s mind without a conscious, explicit intention 
to do so (e.g., Schneider et al., 2017; Back & Apperly, 2010). Neuroimaging research has 
revealed substantial overlap in brain areas involved in implicit and explicit ToM (e.g. 
Naughtin et al., 2017), though differences in performance have been observed in these two 
domains. When examining explicit ToM abilities, tasks tend to require responses that 
demonstrate an overall understanding of different ToM scenarios (e.g., yes/no answers; 
explicit verbal/pointing responses). Prior studies have shown that older adults perform 
consistently worse than younger adults on these explicit measures, indicating a decline in 
explicit ToM abilities with advancing age (see Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey (2013) for a 
meta-analysis). More recently however, research has begun to use more sensitive 
measures, such as eye-tracking, response times, and electrophysiological methods (e.g., 
event-related potentials, ERPs), to examine the implicit cognitive processes underlying ToM 
engagement in adults (e.g. Schneider, Bayliss, Becker, & Dux, 2012; Ferguson, Scheepers, & 
Sanford, 2010; Ferguson, Apperly, & Cane, 2017). This research has demonstrated that, 
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despite declines in older age seen in explicit ToM abilities, some aspects of implicit ToM 
processing may remain intact in older age. For instance, Grainger, Henry, Naughtin, Comino, 
and Dux (2018) conducted a study in which younger and older adults watched a series of 
videos where true- or false-belief states of characters were manipulated, whilst eye 
movements were recorded. Analysis of anticipatory looking behaviour revealed similar 
success levels for implicit false-belief processing in the two groups, despite older adults 
showing a deficit compared to the younger adults in explicit ToM processing abilities 
(assessed using an emotion-recognition task). 
This distinction between implicit and explicit ToM task performance is further 
demonstrated by developmental research that has shown advanced ToM skills are present 
in explicit measures from around 5-7 years old (Brent, Rios, Happé, & Charman, 2004; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), but that even healthy adults 
make errors when judging the perspective of another person, suggesting a resilient 
egocentric bias/‘pull of reality’ in processing of mental states during ToM use (Keysar et al., 
2000; Birch & Bloom, 2007; Ferguson, Apperly, Ahmad, Bindemann, & Cane, 2015; Ferguson 
& Breheny, 2011, 2012; Bradford, Gomez, & Jentzsch, 2018). However, other research has 
suggested that, at least at an implicit level, another person’s perspective is automatically 
processed (e.g. Samson et al., 2010; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Schneider, Slaughter, 
& Dux, 2017). For example, Surtees and Apperly (2012) found that, in a visual perspective 
taking task in which an avatar could see either the same or a different number of dots as the 
participant in a virtual room, both children and adults were slower to respond when the 
avatar’s view differed from the participant’s, even when this was irrelevant to the task (i.e., 
when asked to respond from the ‘self’ perspective, so that the avatar’s perspective could be 
ignored). These results were consistent with findings from Samson et al. (2010) and Qureshi 
et al. (2010) who report that participants’ judgments about their own perspectives were 
both slower and more error prone when an avatar in the task had a different perspective. 
This research indicates a differentiation between implicit ToM – where the mere presence 
of a social agent can slow down an individual’s responses, indicating automatic processing 
of other people’s perspectives – and explicit ToM, where adults are shown to make 
egocentric errors, suggesting a failure to engage in ToM abilities.  
Alongside eye-tracking measures, recent research has also utilized ERPs to examine 
the neural substrates of ToM processing, either using tasks that require participants to 
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make an explicit judgment about a belief-state of a story character (e.g., Sabbagh & Taylor, 
2000; Liu, Sabbagh, Gehring, & Wellman, 2004; Zhang et al., 2009) or tasks that require 
participants to observe pictorial depictions of different belief-states, providing a more 
implicit measure of ToM processing (e.g., Meinhardt et al., 2012; Kühn-Popp et al., 2013). 
When participants were explicitly prompted to make belief inferences this elicited a 
frontally distributed late slow wave (LSW) (Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004), which 
was similar to the more widely distributed LSW that was elicited when belief inferences 
were implicit. These overlapping brain responses indicate that people continue to consider 
other’s beliefs, even when they were not directly prompted to track the other person’s 
mental state. Further ERP evidence for implicit ToM processing has been found among 
young adults by examining modulations of the N400 effect. The N400 is a centro-parietal 
component that is sensitive to stimulus predictability and semantic integration processes 
during language comprehension, showing more negative-going amplitudes when an 
anomaly is detected (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; Lau et al., 2013; Nieuwland et al., 2018; 
Westley et al., 2017).  
In Ferguson, Cane, Douchkov, and Wright (2015)’s study, participants read a series of 
short narratives in which a character held a true or false belief about the location of an 
object, and subsequently acted in a manner that was consistent or inconsistent with this 
belief state. ERPs were time-locked to the visual onset of the sentence-final critical word 
(i.e. the object’s location). For instance, if a character witnessed an object being moved 
(true-belief) from Location A to Location B, the character should look for the object in 
Location B (consistent outcome, where both the character and they know it to be located), 
rather than Location A (inconsistent outcome). In contrast, if the character did not witness 
the object being moved (false-belief), the character should look for the object in the original 
Location A (consistent outcome, even though the object is no longer there) and not Location 
B (inconsistent outcome, even though this is the true object location). Results showed a 
classic N400 effect in true-belief scenarios, whereby inconsistent actions elicited a more 
negative-going N400 than consistent actions. However, this pattern was reversed for false-
belief scenarios, as consistent trials elicited a more negative-going N400 than inconsistent 
trials. This indicated that, when reading the stories, participants were not automatically 
integrating events according to the character’s beliefs, but rather were processing the 
stories from their own egocentric perspective (i.e., their own knowledge of reality). 
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Interestingly, contrasting effects have been found among adolescent participants 
(aged 10-15 years) who completed a similar reading paradigm, while another person was 
either present or absent in the room (Westley, Kohút, & Rueschemeyer, 2017). In Westley 
et al.’s study, adolescent participants read a story presented on a computer screen in the 
presence of a confederate. The start of each story was presented to just the adolescent, 
with the confederate in the room but unable to see the computer screen, creating different 
knowledge states for the participant and the confederate. The final sentence of the story 
presented either a plausible or implausible outcome, and was seen by both the participant 
and the confederate. Results of this joint comprehension task showed a significant N400 
effect (i.e., more negative-going N400 effect following implausible outcomes versus 
plausible sentence outcomes) when the final sentence was implausible for the confederate 
who had not read the full story, even though it was plausible for the fully informed 
participant. These results suggest that the adolescent participants were automatically 
simulating the perspective of the other person during the task, and considered this more 
limited perspective when integrating events in the stories, even though events in the story 
made sense from their own perspective. Though there are clear methodological differences 
between Ferguson et al’s (2015) and Westley et al.’s studies (in terms of language content, 
and social environment), it is puzzling that adolescents should have better awareness of 
others’ perspectives compared to adults. These mixed results therefore highlight the 
importance of examining implicit mental state attribution capacities across the lifespan in a 
single task, which will allow novel insights into how these abilities and underlying neural 
mechanisms may change at different ages.  
Understanding of the processes underlying implicit mental state attribution is 
important, allowing further insight into potential underlying causes of age-related 
difficulties in ToM, which in turn can have important functional outcomes (Grainger et al., 
2018; Henry, von Hippel, Molenberghs, Lee, & Sachdev, 2016). Critically, it is important to 
further our understanding of how these processes may change across normal aging, 
including during adolescence, and younger, middle, and older age, as well as building on our 
knowledge of what may be driving these changes. For instance, there is significant evidence 
of a link between ToM and executive functioning abilities, particularly inhibitory control 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001; Perner & Lang, 2000; Bradford, Jentzsch, & Gomez, 2015) and 
working memory (Cane, Ferguson, & Apperly, 2017; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Davis 
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& Pratt, 1996; Lin et al., 2010). These links make sense given that successful social cognition 
requires one to hold in mind multiple perspectives (i.e. working memory), and suppress 
irrelevant perspectives (i.e. inhibitory control). Moreover, there is now robust evidence that 
these cognitive abilities decline with advancing age (Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish, 2003; 
Elderkin-Thompson, Ballmaier, Hellemann, Pham, & Kumar, 2008), with emerging evidence 
suggesting that some aspects of this age-related cognitive decline are manifest from 20-30 
years old, and decreases at a faster rate with increasing age (Klindt et al., 2017; Salthouse, 
2009; Singh-Manoux et al., 2012). Taken together, these findings raise the question of 
whether changes in ToM abilities (such as increases in egocentric bias during ToM 
engagement) are driven by domain-general cognitive factors, such as executive function 
abilities, or whether they are specifically related to changes in social cognition abilities?  
The current study adapted the false-belief ERP task in Ferguson et al. (2015) to the 
auditory domain, examining the N400 as a marker of belief integration, in an age sample of 
participants spanning adolescence (10 years) to older age (86 years). We examined effects 
over early and late phases of the N400 (200-400ms and 400-600ms), based on previous 
observations that auditory N400s tend to begin earlier and last longer than N400s elicited in 
the visual modality (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; Kutas & Van Petten, 1994), as well as in a 
later ‘wrap-up’ period (600-100ms). Moreover, this early/late analysis of the N400 allowed 
us to examine whether an age-related temporal delay exists in narrative-based ToM 
processing, following research showing that typical N400 semantic congruity effects at the 
scalp gets smaller, slower and more variable with age (Kutas & Iragui, 1998). Participants 
also completed measures of inhibitory control and working memory, to provide measures of 
general cognitive skills, allowing analysis of whether any age-related changes in ToM 
abilities are due to declines in social skills per se, or whether they are due to general 
changes in cognitive domains. By including both adolescents – a period of rapid, significant 
cognitive and social development – as well as middle-aged and older individuals, the current 
study includes groups of participants that have, to-date, not been at the forefront of 
research into ToM processes, allowing us to further our understanding of how and when 
implicit mental state attribution processes change across the lifespan.  
In line with the study aims, there were three key predictions: First, we expected to 
replicate Ferguson et al.’s (2015) findings in a large sample of participants, and in the 
auditory modality. That is, a typical N400 effect was expected in true-belief conditions, but a 
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reversed N400 effect was expected in false-belief conditions. Second, if social cognitive skills 
undergo general declines with advancing age, then we predicted that this reversed N400 
effect in false-belief conditions would be larger with increasing age. Alternatively, if implicit 
social skills remain intact in older age, we would not expect age to correlate with N400 
effects in false-belief trials, indicating that all participants experience the same degree of 
egocentric interference on these trials. Finally, we expected to see cognitive skills (i.e., 
working memory and inhibitory control) declining with advancing age, and it was predicted 
that these capacities would correlate with the consistency effects in false-belief story 
conditions.  
 
2. Method 
 
We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all inclusion/ 
exclusion criteria, whether inclusion/exclusion criteria were established prior to data 
analysis, all manipulations, and all measures in the study. 
 
2.1 Participants 
A total of 339 participants (112 males) took part in this study as part of a larger task 
battery. Of this full sample, 20 participants did not have EEG data (due to computer 
difficulties or participant declining to complete the task), and a further 10 participants were 
excluded from analysis due to noisy EEG recordings (retaining less than 60% segments in 
one or more of the critical test conditions after pre-processing). This resulted in a final 
sample of 309 participants (101 males), aged 10-86 years. Participant details, including IQ 
(assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Second Edition), are 
presented in Table 1, divided into four age groups for illustrative purposes. To calculate 
socio-economic status (SES), participants (if aged over 18) or parents of participants (if aged 
under 18) reported on their level of education, household income, and their occupation (job 
title and industry). To calculate an SES index, education level was coded on a scale of 1-6 
(from No qualifications – Postgraduate Degree), and household income and occupational 
class were coded on a scale of 1-7. These three scores were summed to derive an SES index, 
with lower scores indicating lower SES.  
All participants were native English speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, had no known neurological disorders, and no mental health or autism spectrum 
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disorder diagnoses. Participants were recruited from a community sample in the local area 
of Kent, U.K., using a variety of recruitment strategies (e.g., newspaper adverts, local 
groups, word-of-mouth, Kent Child Development Unit). Sample size was determined a-priori 
during grant application, allowing a large data sample across the lifespan to be collected. 
The Ethical Committee of the School of Psychology, University of Kent, U.K., approved the 
study. 
 
Table 1: Participant Characteristics (mean values, with standard deviations in parenthesis) 
 
All 
Adolescents 
(10-19 yrs) 
Young Adults 
(20-39 yrs) 
Middle Adults 
(40-60 yrs) 
Older Adults 
(61-86 yrs) 
N 309 66 69 86 88 
Gender (f:m) 208:101 34:32 49:20 63:23 62:26 
Age (years) 43.83 (22.05) 14.39 (3.01) 29.25 (6.26) 50.60 (6.24) 70.72 (6.62) 
Verbal IQ 109.83 (12.26) 106.42 (10.28) 105.77 (9.33) 106.28 (11.71) 119.06 (11.45) 
Perceptual 
Reasoning IQ 
108.74 (12.78) 107.62 (13.30) 106.71 (11.30) 105.29 (12.91) 114.56 (11.54) 
Full Scale IQ 110.53 (12.22) 107.91 (10.78) 107.03 (9.36) 106.56 (12.23) 119.14 (11.05) 
SES Index 13.75 (3.65) 13.70 (3.99) 13.31 (4.01) 14.13 (3.63) 13.76 (3.13) 
 
2.2 Materials and Design 
The tasks described below were programmed using E-Prime software. 
 
 False-Belief ERP Task 
The false-belief ERP task was modified from Ferguson et al. (2015). Here, verbal 
stimuli were presented to participants auditorily through headphones, rather than visually, 
which allowed us to control for different reading times among the different aged 
participants. The task involved 120 experimental items (see Table 2 for examples; full 
experimental stimuli are available at  
osf.io/pw7h6/?view_only=9bb79f149f02419285ccaf8c8b89caf3). Each item was 
constructed of three sentences, depicting classic change of location true/false belief 
scenarios. The first sentence introduced a character and described the character placing a 
target object in a specific location. The second sentence then described a second character 
moving the target object to a new location. Importantly, this action was either observed 
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(resulting in a true-belief about the target object’s location) or not observed (i.e., not seen, 
resulting in a false-belief about the target object’s location) by the first character. The third, 
final, sentence described the first character looking for the target object, referring to them 
looking in a location that was either consistent or inconsistent with their true/false belief 
state. This resulted in a 2 (belief: true vs. false) x 2 (consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent) 
within-subjects design. There were four presentation lists of experimental stimuli, with each 
list containing 120 experimental items, 30 in each of the four conditions, using a Latin 
square design. In addition, there were 65 unrelated filler stories (approximately the same 
length as experimental items, but did not depict beliefs) that were randomly interspersed 
among the experimental items. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of the four 
test lists, meaning that each participant heard each target sentence in one of the four 
conditions (i.e., they did not hear the same story more than once). 
 
Table 2: Example experimental item in each of the four test conditions. Target word is underlined 
here for illustration. 
True Belief 
Consistent 
Nick bought some chocolate and put it in the cupboard. Later, Nick 
noticed Emily move the chocolate to the fridge. When Nick wanted 
to eat some chocolate he looked in the fridge.  
Inconsistent 
Nick bought some chocolate and put it in the cupboard. Later, Nick 
noticed Emily move the chocolate to the fridge. When Nick wanted 
to eat some chocolate he looked in the cupboard. 
False Belief 
Consistent 
Nick bought some chocolate and put it in the cupboard. While Nick 
was out for a run, Emily moved the chocolate to the fridge. When 
Nick wanted to eat some chocolate he looked in the cupboard.   
Inconsistent 
Nick bought some chocolate and put it in the cupboard. While Nick 
was out for a run, Emily moved the chocolate to the fridge. When 
Nick wanted to eat some chocolate he looked in the fridge.   
 
In the task, each trial began with the presentation of a single centrally located red fixation 
cross shown for 500 ms to signal the start of a new trial. After this time, the fixation cross 
turned black (remaining on screen for the duration of the trial), and the audio stimuli began 
following a 500 ms delay. Target words were always the final word of the third sentence. 
Event related potentials for analysis were time-locked to the auditory onset of the target 
word. After each sentence, there was a blank screen for 1000 ms before the next trial 
began. One third of the experimental stories (i.e., 10 in each condition) and 27 of the filler 
stories were followed by a question about how appropriate the target character’s actions 
were, and participants were prompted to respond using a Likert-Type scale from 1 = very 
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appropriate to 5 = very inappropriate. These questions were included as a check that 
participants were paying attention to the stories, and to ensure they interpreted events 
appropriately according to the character’s perspective (i.e., an inconsistent action from the 
character should be rated as ‘very inappropriate’). There were eight practice trials to 
familiarize participants with the procedure, three of which had an example 
‘appropriateness’ question after them. The main experimental items were presented in a 
random order in 10 blocks of 12 stories. Each block was separated by a break, the duration 
of which was determined by the participant.  
 
Stroop Task 
 A classic Stroop word-based task (Stroop, 1935) was used to measure inhibitory 
control. Participants were told they would see a word on the computer screen, and were 
required to respond to the ink colour of the presented word as quickly and as accurately as 
possible. Responses were made using a button box with four colour buttons – red, green, 
blue, and yellow. Participants first completed 20 practice trials, including 10 neutral and 10 
congruent trials in pseudo-randomised order. For the experimental trials, participants were 
presented with words printed in red, green, blue, or yellow ink, shown on a grey 
background. There were 50 congruent trials (e.g., “RED” printed in red ink), 50 incongruent 
trials (e.g., “RED” printed in blue ink), and 50 neutral trials (i.e., a neutral word such as 
“MEET”), presented in pseudo-randomised order, in which the same colour word, printed 
colour, or the same colour word/printed colour pair did not appear on two consecutive 
trials. A blank screen appeared for 1000ms at the start of the experimental trials, and the 
next trial was started immediately after the participant made a response. For analysis, 
response times for congruent and incongruent trials were log-transformed to adjust for age-
related slowing; the dependent variable used for analysis was the Stroop congruency effect 
(i.e., log-transformed incongruent trial mean response time minus log-transformed 
congruent trial mean response time). 
 
Operation-Span (OSpan) 
 To assess working memory capacities, the Operation-Span (OSpan; Unsworth et al., 
2005) was used. In the task, participants were asked to solve maths equations whilst 
concurrently remembering letter sequences. During the task, a maths equation appeared on 
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screen (e.g., (2x2)+1=3); participants needed to indicate whether the answer presented was 
correct or incorrect, and there was no time constraint for this response. After the maths 
equation, a single letter was presented; this was repeated two to seven times (i.e., a 
minimum of two letters to remember, a maximum of seven letters to remember, in a given 
trial). Letters were shown for 800ms. Trials were presented in randomized order, with three 
trials for each level. This resulted in 18 trials total, including 81 maths problems and 81 
letters. At the end of each trial, a 4x3 matrix was displayed on the screen, from which 
participants were required to indicate the letters they had seen, in the correct order, by 
clicking on a box next to the appropriate letter. There was a ‘blank’ button available to 
select if participants could not remember the letter in the sequence. There was no time limit 
for completing this matrix. Participants were given feedback after each trial detailing their 
word recall accuracy and percentage correct for the maths equations. Participants were 
encouraged to keep their maths accuracy score at or above 85% throughout the task. The 
dependent variable used for analysis was a partial OSpan score, calculated as the total 
number of letters recalled in the correct position. 
 
2.3.1 Procedure 
The tasks were completed as part of a larger task battery involved in the 
‘CogSoCoAGE’ study which lasted approximately 5 hours in total. No part of the study 
procedures or analyses were pre-registered in a time-stamped, institutional registry prior to 
the research being conducted. Participants completed the tasks over one or two days, and 
tasks were administered in a counterbalanced order.  
 
2.4 EEG Recording and Analysis 
 
2.4.1 Electrophysiological Measures 
A Brain Vision Quickamp amplifier system was used with an ActiCap cap for 
continuous recording of EEG activity from 30 electrodes, referenced to FCz. Vertical electro-
oculogram (VEOG) activity was recorded from one extra electrode (below right eye), and 
horizontal electro-oculogram (HEOG) activity was recorded from one extra electrode (to the 
left of the left eye). EEG and EOG recordings were sampled at 1000 Hz, and electrode 
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impedance was kept below 10kΩ. Prior to segmentation offline, a vertical ocular calculation 
was applied (1*Fp2+(-1*VEOG)). All data were re-referenced to a left/right mastoid average 
reference. EEG and EOG activity were band-pass filtered (0.1-30Hz, notch filter at 50Hz). The 
raw data were visually inspected for noisy sections or channels, and for other general 
artifacts. EEG activity containing blinks or horizontal eye movements was corrected using a 
semi-automatic ocular ICA correction approach (Brain Vision Analyzer, 2.1). An average of 
four ICA components were removed per participant. Semi-automatic artifact detection 
software (Brain Vision Analyzer 2) was run, to identify and discard trials with non-ocular 
artifacts (drifts, channel blockings, EEG activity exceeding ± 75μV). This procedure resulted 
in an average trial-loss of 10% per condition. Ten participants were removed from analysis 
due to less than 60% segments remaining in one or more of the critical test conditions after 
pre-processing, resulting in a final sample size for analysis of 309 participants (101 males).  
2.4.2 ERP Data Analysis 
For analysis of scalp-based ERP effects, the signal at each electrode site was 
averaged separately for each participant and experimental condition, time-locked to the 
onset of the target word. Waveforms were aligned to a 200ms baseline prior to target word 
onset. Mean ERP amplitudes were determined across three time windows (200-400ms, 400-
600ms, and 600-1000ms), which allowed us to examine how the detection of belief-
inconsistencies evolves over different phases of the N400, and a later ‘wrap-up’ period 
(reflecting processing at sentence conclusion), and whether effects in these time periods are 
differentially modulated by age.  
To assess ERP amplitudes over lateral electrodes four regions of interests (ROIs) 
were used, dividing electrodes along a left/right dimension and an anterior/posterior 
dimension, as in Ferguson et al. (2015). The two ROIs over the left hemisphere were: left-
anterior (F7, F3, FC5, FC1), and left-posterior (CP1, CP5, P7, P3, O1); two homologue ROIs 
were defined for the right hemisphere. ERP amplitudes over midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, Pz, 
Oz), where the N400 is maximal, were analysed separately from lateral electrode sites. To 
analyse the N400 in each experimental condition, a repeated-measures ANOVA was 
performed over lateral electrodes in a 2 (Belief: true vs false) x 2 (Consistency: consistent vs. 
inconsistent) x 2 (Hemisphere: left vs right) x 2 (Ant/Pos: anterior vs posterior) design. For 
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midline electrodes, a 2 (Belief: true vs. false) x 2 (Consistency: consistency vs. inconsistent) x 
4 (Electrode: Fz, Cz, Pz, Oz) repeated-measures ANOVA was used. 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Appropriateness Ratings 
 First, participants’ judgements of appropriateness were analyzed to examine 
whether participants explicitly detected belief inappropriate behaviors in the stories. A 2 
(Belief: true vs false) x 2 (Consistency: consistent vs inconsistent) repeated-measures 
ANOVA was run on appropriateness ratings (1 = very appropriate, 5 = very inappropriate). 
Both the main effects of Consistency [F(1,308) = 941.44, p < .001, ƞp
2 = .75] and 
Belief [F(1,308) = 6.32, p = .01, ƞp
2 = .02] were significant. As expected, participants showed 
a general tendency to rate belief consistent behaviors lower (i.e. more appropriate) than 
belief inconsistent behaviors, and rated true-belief stories overall as more appropriate than 
false-belief stories. Moreover, these main effects were subsumed under an interaction 
between Belief and Consistency [F(1,308) = 94.96, p <.001 ƞp
2 = .24]. This interaction 
showed that although participants rated consistent behaviors as more appropriate than 
inconsistent outcomes in both true-belief (MConsistent = 1.47; MInconsistent = 3.82; t(308) = 
34.43, p < .001) and false-belief (MConsistent = 1.78; MInconsistent = 3.39; t(308) = 19.82, p < .001) 
contexts, this difference was larger within true-belief contexts [t(308) = 9.75, p < .001]. 
Overall, these results indicate that participants successfully tracked the character’s beliefs in 
both true- and false-belief stories, and explicitly detected the false belief, as highlighted by 
suitable ratings of behavior appropriateness across different contexts. 
 
3.2 N400 analyses 
 
Full statistical effects for the three time windows (200-400ms, 400-600ms, and 600-
1000ms), over lateral and midline electrode sites are summarised in Table 3; full data for 
each measure is available on the Open Science Framework 
(osf.io/pw7h6/?view_only=9bb79f149f02419285ccaf8c8b89caf3). Note that due to space 
constraints, only significant effects that involve the Belief or Consistency variables are 
presented in the text. Figure 1 shows the topographical maps of ERP difference waveforms 
for the consistency effect in each belief condition, shown separately for participants in the 
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four age groups described in Table 1 for illustration purposes. Figure 2 shows the grand 
average ERP waveforms over three midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, and Pz). 
 
3.2.1 200-400ms Time Window 
 Analysis of lateral electrodes revealed the expected significant interaction between 
Belief and Consistency. There were also significant interactions between Belief*Hemisphere, 
Consistency*Hemisphere, and Belief*Consistency*Hemisphere, which were further 
subsumed under a four-way interaction between Belief, Consistency, Hemisphere, and 
Ant/Post. To explore this four-way interaction, post-hoc analyses was conducted using a 2 
(Belief) x 2 (Consistency) x 2 (Ant/Pos) repeated-measures ANOVA, separately for the left 
and right hemispheres (using Bonferroni corrections to control for multiple comparisons, 
leading to a new significance criterion of .025). For the left hemisphere, results showed a 
significant Belief*Consistency interaction [F(1,308) = 11.46, p = .001, ƞp
2 = .036], which was 
further subsumed under a three-way interaction with Anterior/Posterior [F(1,308) = 5.84, p 
= .016, ƞp
2 = .019]. This three-way interaction reflected a significant Belief*Consistency 
interaction in left-posterior regions [F(1,308) = 18.42, p < .001, ƞp
2 =  .056], which was not 
present in left-anterior regions [F(1,308) = .671, p = .413, ƞp
2 = .002]. For the right 
hemisphere, there was a significant Belief*Consistency interaction [F(1,308) = 60.16, p < 
.001, ƞp
2 = .163], but no three-way interaction with Anterior/Posterior [p = .385]. Where this 
Belief*Consistency interaction was significant, it reflected the classic N400 for true-belief 
stories (i.e., a more negative-going wave-form for inconsistent versus consistent; all ts > 
2.98, ps < .003), but a reversed N400 effect for false-belief stories (i.e., a more negative-
going wave-form for consistent versus inconsistent; all ts > 3.23, ps < .005).  
 Over midline electrodes, there were significant interactions between 
Belief*Consistency, and Consistency*Electrodes, both of which were further subsumed 
under a three-way interaction between Belief, Consistency, and Electrode. Post-hoc 
analyses, using Bonferroni corrections to control for multiple comparisons, leading to a new 
significance criterion of .0125, revealed that the Belief*Consistency interaction was 
significant at Fz [F(1,308) = 15.11, p < .001, ƞp
2 = .047], Cz [F(1,308) = 74.38, p < .001, ƞp
2 = 
.20], and Pz [F(1,308) = 43.88, p < .001, ƞp
2 = .13], but not at Oz [F(1,308) = 5.37, p = .021, ƞp
2 
= .02]). Over electrodes Cz and Pz, the interaction showed that the N400 was more 
negative-going for inconsistent versus consistent in true-belief stories (ts > 4.87, ps < .001), 
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but more negative-going for consistent versus inconsistent in false-belief stories (ts > 4.65 ps 
< .001). At Fz, the consistency effect was only significant for false-belief stories (t(308) = 
5.66, p < .001; consistent < inconsistent). 
 In summary, results in the 200-400ms time window supported our first hypothesis, 
showing a typical N400 effect in true-belief conditions (i.e., more negative-going waveforms 
for inconsistent versus consistent story outcomes), and a reversed N400 effect in false-belief 
conditions (i.e., more negative-going waveforms for consistent versus inconsistent story 
outcomes), indicating egocentric processing of the stories in false-belief scenarios. 
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Table 3: Results from analyses over lateral and midline electrodes using repeated-measures ANOVAs, in three time windows (200-400ms, 400-600ms, 600-
1000ms). Degrees of freedom for all variables = 1,308. 
200-400ms 400-600ms 600-1000ms 
 
F p ƞp
2
 F p ƞp
2
 F p ƞp
2
 
L
a
t
e
r
a
l
 
E
l
e
c
t
r
o
d
e
s
 
Belief .052 .82 <.001 .055 .814 <.001 .032 .859 <.001 
Consistency .988 .321 .003 1.65 .001*** .033 7.19 .008** .023 
Hemisphere .409 .523 .001 .007 .935 <.001 .641 .424 .002 
Ant/Post 25.84 <.001*** .077 44.14 <.001*** .125 .245 .621 .001 
Belief*Consistency 41.18 <.001*** .118 .309 .579 .001 <.001 .991 <.001 
Belief*Hemisphere 7.52 .006** .024 9.29 .003** .029 2.72 .1 .009 
Consistency*Hemsiphere 8.35 .004** .026 16.39 <.001*** .051 29.31 <.001*** .087 
Belief*Consistency*Hemisphere 11.9 .001*** .037 2.99 .085 .01 .018 .894 <.001 
Belief*Ant/Post 3.26 .072 .01 3.45 .064 .011 3.36 .068 .011 
Consistency*Ant/Post 3.25 .073 .01 1.33 .249 .004 7.48 .007** .024 
Belief*Consistency*Ant/Post 2.97 .086 .01 18.22 <.001*** .056 22.88 <.001*** .069 
Hemisphere*Ant/Post 16.28 <.001*** .05 9.77 .002** .031 .934 .335 .003 
Belief*Hemisphere*Ant/Post 3.37 .068 .011 3.56 .06 .011 .838 .361 .003 
Consistency*Hemsiphere*Ant/Post .978 .323 .003 .821 .366 .003 .613 .434 .002 
Belief*Consistency*Hemisphere*Ant/Post 5.38 .021* .017 1.97 .161 .006 .323 .57 .001 
M
i
d
l
i
n
e
 
E
l
e
c
t
r
o
d
e
s
 
Belief .033 .856 <.001 .082 .775 <.001 .533 .466 .002 
Consistency 2.43 .12 .008 12.6 <.001*** .039 6.07 .014* .019 
Electrode 174.89 <.001 .362 79.06 <.001*** .204 7.74 <.001*** .187 
Belief*Consistency 66.87 <.001 .178 3.45 .064 .011 .183 .669 .001 
Belief*Electrode .954 .414 .003 3.53 .015** .011 3.24 .022* .01 
Consistency*Electrode 1.1 <.001 .032 5.8 .001*** .018 18.76 <.001*** .057 
Belief*Consistency*Electrode 8.77 <.001 .031 11.22 <.001*** .035 11.49 <.001*** .036 
***Significant at <.001; **Significant at <.01; *Significant at <.05 
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3.2.2 400-600ms Time Window 
 Analysis of lateral electrodes revealed a significant main effect of Consistency, which 
was further modulated by Hemisphere. This Consistency*Hemisphere interaction revealed 
more negative-going N400 amplitudes for consistent versus inconsistent conditions in the 
left hemisphere [t(308) = 4.85, p < .001], but no significant difference in the right 
hemisphere [t(308) = .60, p = .55]. There was also a significant interaction between Belief 
and Hemisphere, however, none of the post-hoc comparisons reached significance (all ts < 
1.7). More importantly, the three-way interaction between Belief, Consistency, and 
Ant/Post was significant. Post-hoc analyses using Bonferroni corrections to control for 
multiple comparisons, leading to a new significance criterion of .025, showed that the 
Belief*Consistency interaction was significant for both anterior [F(1,308) = 12.48, p < .001, 
ƞp
2 = .04] and posterior electrodes [F(1,308) = 8.26, p = .004, ƞp
2 = .03], reflecting different 
patterns in each region. Over anterior electrodes, the N400 was more negative-going for 
consistent versus inconsistent in false-belief stories (t(308) = 3.59, p < .001), but did not 
differ in true-belief stories (t(308) = 1.73, p = .084). Over posterior electrodes, the N400 was 
more negative-going for consistent versus inconsistent in true-belief stories (t(308) = 4.21, p 
< .001), but did not differ in false-belief stories (t(308) = .17, p = .867). 
 The midline electrode analysis showed a significant main effect of Consistency 
(consistent < inconsistent), as well as significant interaction effects between 
Belief*Electrode and Consistency*Electrode, which were further subsumed in a three-way 
interaction between Belief, Consistency, and Electrode. Post-hoc analyses, using Bonferroni 
corrections to control for multiple comparisons, leading to a new significance criterion of 
.0125, revealed that the Belief*Consistency interaction was significant at electrodes Fz 
[F(1,308) = 21.19, p < .001, ƞp
2 = .06] and Cz [F(1,308) = 9.46, p = .002, ƞp
2 = .03], but not at 
electrodes Pz [F = 2.36, p = .13] and Oz [F = 1.55, p = .21]. Over electrodes Fz and Cz, the 
interaction showed that the N400 was more negative-going for consistent versus 
inconsistent in false-belief stories (ts > 4.61, ps < .001), but did not differ in true-belief 
stories (ts < .72 ps > .47). 
 In summary, results in the 400-600ms time window showed a reversed N400 effect 
in false-belief conditions across anterior electrodes (i.e., more negative-going waveforms for 
consistent versus inconsistent story outcomes), indicating egocentric processing of the 
stories in false-belief scenarios. In true-belief contexts, the typical N400 effect was now 
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reversed so that the N400 was more negative-going for consistent versus inconsistent 
stories over posterior electrodes.  
 
3.2.3 600-1000ms Time Window 
 Analysis of lateral electrodes revealed a significant main effect of Consistency, which 
was further modulated by Hemisphere. This Consistency*Hemisphere interaction revealed 
more negative-going N400 amplitudes for consistent versus inconsistent conditions in the 
left hemisphere [t(308) = -4.90, p < .001], but no significant difference in the right 
hemisphere [t(308) = .359, p = .72]. There was also a significant interaction between 
Consistency and Ant/Post; this interaction reflected more negative-going amplitudes for 
consistent versus inconsistent conditions in anterior regions [t(308) = -3.52, p < .001], but no 
significant difference in the posterior regions [t(308) = -.157, p = .876]. More importantly, 
the three-way interaction between Belief, Consistency, and Ant/Post was significant. Post-
hoc analyses using Bonferroni corrections to control for multiple comparisons, leading to a 
new significance criterion of .025, showed that the Belief*Consistency interaction was 
significant for both anterior [F(1,308) = 8.46, p = .004, ƞp
2 = .027] and posterior electrodes 
[F(1,308) = 8.93, p = .003, ƞp
2 = .028], reflecting different patterns in each region. Over 
anterior electrodes, the N400 was more negative-going for consistent versus inconsistent in 
false-belief stories [t(308) = -4.65, p < .001], but did not differ in true-belief stories [t(308) = 
-.613, p = .541]. Over posterior electrodes, the N400 was more negative-going for consistent 
versus inconsistent in true-belief stories [t(308) = -2.21, p = .028], but was more negative-
going for inconsistent versus consistent in false-belief stories [t(308) = 2.17, p = .031]. 
 Midline electrode analysis showed a significant main effect of Consistency 
(consistent < inconsistent), as well as significant interaction effects between 
Belief*Electrode and Consistency*Electrode, which were further subsumed in a three-way 
interaction between Belief, Consistency, and Electrode. Post-hoc analyses, using Bonferroni 
corrections to control for multiple comparisons, leading to a new significance criterion of 
.0125, revealed that the Belief*Consistency interaction was significant at electrodes Fz 
[F(1,308) = 9.82, p = .002, ƞp
2 = .031] and Pz [F(1,308) = 8.95, p = .003, ƞp
2 = .028], but not at 
electrodes Cz [F(1, 308) = 1.01, p = .316, ƞp
2 = .003] or Oz [F(1,308) = 4.27, p = .040, ƞp
2 = 
.014]. Over electrode Fz, the interaction showed that the N400 was more negative-going for 
consistent versus inconsistent in false-belief stories [t(308) = -6.33, p < .001], with no 
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significant difference in true-belief stories [t(308) = -2.44, p = .015]. Over electrode Pz, there 
was no significant difference in N400 amplitudes in either true-belief [t(308) = -2.25, p = 
.025] or false-belief [t(308) = 2.23, p = .027] stories.  
 In summary, results in the 600-1000ms time window showed a reversed N400 effect 
in false-belief conditions across anterior electrodes (i.e., more negative-going waveforms for 
consistent versus inconsistent story outcomes), indicating continued egocentric processing 
of the false-belief scenarios. In true-belief stories, the N400 was again more negative-going 
for consistent versus inconsistent stories across posterior electrodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Topographic maps of the ERP difference waveform for each belief context 
condition (inconsistent minus consistent), between 200-1000ms from critical word onset, 
shown separately for participants in the four age groups described in Table 1 for illustration 
purposes. 
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Figure 1: Grand average ERPs over midline electrodes elicited by critical words in the target 
sentence for each of the four conditions. Note that negativity is plotted upwards. 
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3.3 Correlations 
 Next, we investigated whether and how age influenced the detection of story 
character’s inconsistent behaviors, within true-belief and false-belief contexts1. In particular, 
we aimed to examine whether the initial egocentric interpretation of story events (i.e. the 
reversed N400 effect within false-belief stories) was driven by, or enhanced in, the older 
participants in our sample, reflecting an age-related decline in ToM ability. In addition, given 
the robust evidence for age-related decline in cognitive skills that have been associated with 
false belief reasoning (i.e. working memory and inhibitory control), we examined whether 
individual differences in these skills predicted the detection of inconsistencies in the story 
comprehension task.  
To facilitate these analyses, a ‘consistency effect’ variable was calculated for each 
individual, separately for true-belief and false-belief conditions. N400 amplitudes were 
pooled over posterior electrode sites (CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, P7, P3, P4, P8, O1, O2), and 
difference scores were calculated by subtracting the mean N400 amplitude in the consistent 
condition from the inconsistent condition, separately for the three time-windows (200-
400ms, 400-600ms, 600-1000ms). Here, a negative score indicates a larger N400 effect for 
the inconsistent compared to consistent condition (i.e. appropriate anomaly detection), and 
a more positive score indicates a larger effect for the consistent compared to inconsistent 
condition (i.e., interpreting events egocentrically in false belief contexts). Individual 
differences in working memory capacity and inhibitory control were assessed using the 
partial OSpan score and the Stroop congruency effect, respectively. Note that due to 
computer error or participant refusal to complete task, data was missing for eight 
participants on the OSpan task, and three from the Stroop task. Full statistical effects for 
these correlation analyses are presented in Table 4. Figure 3 shows correlations with age 
and the consistency effect in the three N400 time windows. 
 Analysis of the posterior electrodes showed that in the 200-400ms N400 time 
window, age did not significantly correlate with the inconsistency effect in either true-belief 
or false-belief contexts. Importantly, this suggests that across all ages, participants initially 
anchored comprehension of false-belief stories to their own egocentric perspective rather 
than to the character’s more limited knowledge, and that this egocentric tendency did not 
                                                      
1
 Please see Supplementary Materials on OSF 
(https://osf.io/pw7h6/?view_only=9bb79f149f02419285ccaf8c8b89caf3) for details of the main ANOVA 
analyses run separately for the four age groups described in Table 1. 
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increase with advancing age. In the 400-600ms time window, age did not significantly 
correlate with the consistency effect in true-belief trials, however results revealed a 
significant positive correlation between age and the consistency effect in false-belief trials2 
[r(309) = .123, p = .03]. Here, the size of the consistency effect increased with increasing 
age, which suggests that false-belief events were more likely to be interpreted from an 
egocentric perspective in older age. For the 600-1000ms time window, there were no 
significant correlations with age for the consistency effect in either true- or false-belief 
trials.  
Finally, as expected, age was significantly negatively correlated with both working 
memory capacity [r(301) = -.314, p < .001] and inhibitory control [r(306) = -.203, p < .001], 
replicating the robust patterns of age-related cognitive decline seen in previous research 
among our sample. Importantly, neither of these cognitive skills significantly correlated with 
N400 responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
2
 Note that follow-up stepwise multiple regression analysis showed that the linear model best described the 
data [F(1,307) = 4.75, p = .030], and adding the quadratic coefficient (that might best fit a pattern where belief 
reasoning skills continue to develop through adolescence, reaching a peak at some point in adulthood, before 
declining in older age) did not significantly change the R
2
 from the linear model [F(1,306) = 2.56, p = .11].  
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Figure 3: Correlations between age (years) and the N400 consistency effect (inconsistent minus 
consistent), plotted separately for ERP effects in the three time windows (200-400ms, 400-600ms, 
and 600-1000ms) across posterior regions. Data for true-belief stories are shown with the letter ‘T’ 
in the upper panels, and data for false-belief stories are shown with the letter ‘F’ in the lower panels. 
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Table 4: Correlations (N = 309) between age and the N400 consistency effect (posterior region) in three time-windows (200-400ms, 400-600ms, and 600-
1000ms), across true/false belief contents, and executive function abilities (working memory [Ospan] and inhibition [Stroop]). 
 
   
200-400ms 
 
400-600ms 
 
600-1000ms 
   
  
Age 
True 
Belief 
False 
Belief  
True 
Belief 
False 
Belief  
True 
Belief 
False 
Belief  
Working 
Memory 
Inhibition 
Posterior Electrodes 
 
Age - 
           
200-400ms 
True Belief .045 - 
          
False Belief -.047 -.026 - 
         
400-600ms 
True Belief -.013 .649*** .015 
 
- 
       
False Belief .123* -.059 .635*** 
 
-.202*** - 
      
600-1000ms 
True Belief .008 .487*** .001 
 
.793*** -.153** 
 
- 
    
False Belief .091 .021 .581*** 
 
-.086 .720*** 
 
-.074 - 
   
Working Memory -.314*** -.025 .050 
 
.058 -.026 
 
.017 -.026 
 
- 
 
Inhibition -.203*** -.089 .071 
 
-.023 .037 
 
-.044 .045 
 
.181** - 
***Significant at < .001; **Significant at < .01; *Significant at < .05 
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4. Discussion 
 
The ability to understand another person’s perspective is an important part of daily life, 
requiring rapid and efficient computation of how another person’s perspective may differ 
from one’s own current perspective. In this paper, ERP measures were used to assess 
implicit ToM abilities in a belief-state manipulation task. We examined effects of expectancy 
during narrative comprehension on the established N400 effect, comparing neural 
responses to belief-consistent versus belief-inconsistent outcomes in true and false belief 
contexts. The key aim of the study was to examine whether and how implicit ToM changes 
across the lifespan (i.e., whether the extent of ‘egocentric bias’ changes across different 
ages, or whether it remains stable from adolescence through to older age). A unique feature 
of our study is the large sample (N=309) of individuals, aged between 10 and 86 years old, 
which allowed us to track changes across an extended period of development. In addition, 
we explored whether any age-related changes in ToM capacities can be explained by 
domain-general changes in cognitive abilities (specifically working memory and inhibitory 
control) as opposed to domain-specific changes in social-cognitive abilities.  
Our results first established that people can successfully track a story character’s beliefs 
in true- and false-belief contexts (i.e., correctly rating story outcomes as appropriate vs 
inappropriate), indicating explicit understanding of false-belief scenarios across the lifespan. 
Following this, we examined implicit belief processing by analyzing N400 responses to 
different task conditions (belief-type and consistency) across the full sample to establish 
whether participants were sensitive to violations of expectation from the perspective of a 
story character, or were biased to their own situational knowledge (i.e., how egocentric was 
the processing of the stories). This analysis was conducted across three time windows – 
200-400ms, 400-600ms, and 600-1000ms – to allow examination of the timings of these 
effects and whether effects in these time periods are modulated by age. Finally, an N400 
consistency effect was calculated for true- and false-belief contexts separately, to assess 
whether individual differences among participants – specifically, inhibitory control and 
working memory abilities – modulates their ability to successfully consider another person’s 
perspective, and how this ability changes with age. 
Across all participants, results showed that when a story character was in possession of 
a true-belief about an object’s location, the N400 was more negative-going for belief-
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inconsistent than for belief-consistent outcomes, as is typical for semantic and discourse 
anomalies (Camblin et al., 2007; Nieuwland et al., in press; Van Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 
1999). In the true-belief context, this pattern was attenuated or reversed in later time 
windows, likely reflecting a tendency for participants to reprocess the critical word given the 
uncertain context of the experiment (i.e. ~33% of items included a violation). Critically, and 
in line with our first hypothesis, overall analysis of false-belief trials showed the opposite 
pattern of results. That is, in false-belief contexts, belief-consistent outcomes led to more 
negative-going N400 effects than belief-inconsistent outcomes, suggesting that participants 
were processing the stories from an egocentric perspective. These results replicate the 
pattern seen in Ferguson et al., (2015) and indicate that when listening to the stories, 
participants do not immediately integrate the character’s beliefs, but instead initially anchor 
understanding to their own more informed knowledge of the world. These findings fit with 
previous research that has indicated that when engaging ToM capacities, events are often 
processed using an initial egocentric bias (e.g., Ferguson et al., 2015; Ferguson & Breheny, 
2012; Keysar et al., 2000; Birch & Bloom, 2007; Bradford et al., 2018), despite explicit 
measures of ToM (such as the appropriateness ratings in the current task) highlighting that 
participants are able to ultimately overcome this initial bias, and successfully consider the 
wider context of the story to identify whether a character’s actions made sense or not.  
This study makes further important contributions to the literature by examining how 
implicit ToM abilities mature and develop across the lifespan, from adolescence to healthy 
old age. Correlation analyses revealed no significant relationship between age and the 
consistency effect in the early time window (200-400ms after stimulus onset) for either 
true- or false-belief conditions, indicating that during this period, all participants – 
regardless of age – showed an egocentric bias in processing of the stories presented. This is 
important, because it shows that egocentric processing is the default perspective for 
information integration, and that this spontaneous ‘pull of reality’ effect does not increase 
with advancing age (i.e., goes against the suggestion that belief processing gets worse in 
older age). However, in the 400-600ms time window, age was found to influence the 
magnitude of the consistency effect in false-belief (but not true-belief) contexts; as age 
increased the N400 consistency effect also increased. Although this effect was relatively 
weak (r = .123) and thus requires further research to more firmly establish the magnitude of 
this finding, the result provides preliminary evidence that the tendency to interpret story 
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events egocentrically, rather than according to the story character’s more limited beliefs, 
increases with advancing age. In other words, older adults’ neural activity continues to 
reflect an interpretation of the story events according to their own knowledge of reality 
rather than the character’s false belief (i.e., a reversed N400, reflecting more negative-going 
N400 for consistent versus inconsistent), while younger participants had now switched to 
accommodate the character’s actions according to that character’s own (false) belief state 
(i.e., a classic N400, reflecting more negative-going N400 for inconsistent versus consistent). 
By the 600-1000ms ‘wrap-up’ window, this age modulation was no longer present. We 
interpret these results cautiously, given the magnitude of the correlation in the 400-600ms 
time window, and the challenge of linking cognitive outcomes to that of neural data. Taken 
together, however, the results tentatively suggest that whilst all participants initially 
processed events in the stories egocentrically, anchoring comprehension to the ‘self’ 
perspective, younger participants more quickly switched to integrate events according to 
the story character’s perspective compared to older adults, who continued to experience 
interference from their own egocentric perspective until later in the trials. 
It is noted that, in using a cross-sectional design, such as the current study, it is difficult 
to ascertain to what extent these changes are due to age-related differences – for this, 
longitudinal analysis would be required, assessing participants across different time points. 
However, within the scope of this study design, our data provides novel evidence that social 
cognitive skills do undergo changes with advancing age, although even younger participants 
experience some initial difficulty adopting others’ mental states, originally processing the 
stories from an egocentric perspective. Future research using a longitudinal sample would 
be valuable for teasing apart the role of ageing, within-person changes, as opposed to cross-
sectional differences (e.g., Lindenberger, von Oertzen, Ghisletta, & Hertzog, 2011).  
It is important to note that we have interpreted our ERP effects within the constraints 
of the N400 component, and the established cognitive processes that modulate it, since our 
a-priori predictions were based on this. However, we note that the topography of some of 
our effects is uncharacteristic of typical N400 effects (i.e., the consistency effect in false-
belief contexts was maximal over fronto-central rather than centro-parietal scalp sites). It is 
possible that this unusual pattern was driven by the auditory modality in which the 
true/false belief stories were presented (it has been shown that auditory language elicits a 
slightly more frontal N400 than language presented in the visual modality; Kutas & 
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Federmeier, 2011; Kutas & Van Petten, 1994). Alternatively, it could reflect a different 
component all together. Specifically, prior research has observed a later occurring ‘semantic 
P600’ component that is elicited when participants are detecting ‘semantic reversal 
anomalies’, or pragmatic violations and ambiguities (e.g., Schacht, Sommer, Shmuilovich, 
Martíenz, & Martin-Loeches, 2014; Kim & Osterhout, 2005; Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992). 
The P600 has been suggested to play a role in indicating a need for reanalysis following a 
language/lexical violation in a sentence (e.g., Münte, Heinze, Matzke, Wieringa, & Johannes, 
1998; Kuperberg, Sitnikova, Caplan, & Holcomb, 2003). Within this definition of the 
semantic P600, it is possible that the ‘reversed N400’ seen in later time windows for the 
true-belief context and all time windows for the false-belief context (i.e., more positive-
going waveform for inconsistent versus consistent critical words) reflects greater reanalysis 
of the input following a belief-inconsistent word compared to a belief-inconsistent word 
(since listeners reintegrate information after detecting the violation), and thus reflects 
appropriate language processing and reinterpretation in the false-belief context (i.e., 
reanalysis to fit with the character’s false belief). This interpretation fits with the explicit 
ratings of appropriateness, which showed that participants successfully tracked the 
character’s true and false beliefs by the end of the story. Moreover, if the correlation effects 
in the later ‘N400’ time period were interpreted as a semantic P600, this would indicate that 
older adults showed a greater reanalysis for false-belief inconsistencies than younger 
participants, indicating a processing advantage for older adults who are more likely to re-
analyse and ‘repair’ sentences in order to make sense of them. Distinguishing these two 
components using source analysis on the current data is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
future research may focus on examining the role of age in predicting N400 and semantic 
P600 components separately in language processing tasks. 
Our third question asked whether any age-related changes in ToM can be attributed to 
domain-general changes, or whether they are specific to social abilities. Correlation analysis 
highlighted a negative correlation between age and both inhibitory control and working 
memory, indicating that these abilities decline with age, as expected (De Luca et al., 2003; 
Braver & West, 2008; Salthouse, 2009; Schroeder & Salthouse, 2004). Both of these 
executive skills are argued to play an important role in ToM engagement – inhibitory control 
allowing suppression of one’s own perspective in favor of another person’s, and working 
memory allowing multiple mental states to be represented simultaneously. Importantly, the 
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current results highlighted that, contrary to our third hypothesis and despite these age-
related declines in executive functions, age effects seen in the N400 consistency effect for 
false-belief trials in the 400-600ms time window were not reflective of a domain-general 
decline (due to the absence of correlations with either executive function ability), but rather 
a more domain-specific decline in implicit social-cognitive processing abilities. In fact, this 
lack of domain-general input from cognitive abilities concords with recent data from Martin 
et al. (2019) showing that an age-related decline in visual perspective-taking (specifically 
switching from the self to other perspective) is only partially mediated by declines in 
inhibitory control (and not at all by working memory). In our study, this is further supported 
by the correlation with age being restricted to false-belief conditions, rather than true-belief 
conditions, indicating that declines in abilities as a result of increasing age are specifically 
related to an individual’s ability to infer and use ToM online. In true-belief conditions, there 
is no conflict between the participant’s and story character’s belief states, which are both 
aligned with reality, thus removing any potential interference effects between the two 
different perspectives. These data suggest that age-related declines in ToM are specific to 
the social domain, although it remains to be ascertained to what extent the changes in ERP 
amplitudes established in the current study relate to explicit social cognition performance, 
and thus the extent to which ageing effects influence engagement in social cognition 
capacities in everyday life. 
Interestingly, the results from the current study were established despite the older 
adult group having, on average, an IQ over 10 points higher than other groups, reflecting 
the high-functioning cognition of the older participants in this sample. To further examine 
the role of age in predicting differences in the N400 effect, it may be of interest in further 
research to examine how individuals with higher versus lower IQ within one age category 
differentially perform on behavioural and neural measures of ToM, establishing whether IQ 
influences age-related changes in ToM performance. Additionally, the adolescent group in 
the current study showed considerable variation in performance, as highlighted in Figure 3. 
The presence of this variation supports prior research that has suggested large individual 
differences in neurodevelopmental trajectories across individuals during adolescence (e.g., 
Foulkes & Blakemore, 2018; Dumontheil, 2016; Tamnes et al., 2018), and highlights the 
importance of including adolescents in research examining the development of ToM into 
adulthood, with significant changes present throughout adolescence. This critical period of 
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social, psychological, and biological development (Foulkes & Blakemore, 2018) would be 
interesting to examine in more refined detail than permitted by the scope of the current 
paper, exploring how ToM processing may change across the adolescent period, and how 
individual differences may influence these changes.  
In sum, the results of the current study make novel contributions to the field by 
demonstrating that, although older adults were able to explicitly evaluate story events 
according to a character’s (false) beliefs, they experience age-related changes at an implicit 
level. Older participants maintained an egocentric stance for longer than younger 
participants, who were able to switch to take the character’s more limited perspective at a 
later stage of online comprehension. Prior research has suggested a differentiation between 
explicit and implicit ToM abilities, with older adults experiencing greater difficulties than 
younger adults when engaging in explicit ToM tasks (e.g., Bailey & Henry, 2008; German & 
Hehman, 2006; Grainger et al., 2015; Maylor et al., 2002), but showing less age-related 
changes in tasks assessing implicit ToM, where older and younger adults perform 
comparably (e.g., Grainger et al., 2018). In the current study, the need to draw ToM 
inferences was not strictly implicit in the task (i.e., participants were asked to judge the 
appropriateness of the character’s actions after some sentences, thus were cued to attend 
to the character’s perspective), but our ERP data highlights age-related changes in implicit 
measures, indicating a possible explanation for experiences of declining social skills at older 
ages. The results highlight that with increasing age, interference from the self perspective is 
more pervasive, and inhibition of this egocentric perspective takes longer to achieve. In 
turn, this could lead to repercussions during social interactions, with delayed processing of 
the perspectives of other people when engaging in social situations. Further research is 
needed to establish the impact that this elongated egocentric bias in online ToM may have 
on everyday social functioning. 
 
4.1 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results of the current study provide novel evidence that people 
experience an egocentric bias in implicit ToM processing that persists throughout the 
lifespan. When listening to stories in which a character is described as having a true-belief 
about an objects location, a standard N400 effect is elicited when the character acts in an 
inconsistent manner (versus consistent). In contrast, in false-belief conditions an enhanced 
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N400 effect is seen when a character acts in a belief-consistent manner (versus belief-
inconsistent), indicating that the stories have been processed from the participant’s own 
perspective, failing to spontaneously consider the perspective of the character. ERP results 
showed that in an early time window (200-400ms post stimulus onset) there was no 
significant effect of age, suggesting that all individuals demonstrated this egocentric effect 
to a comparable degree. In contrast, a significant effect of age emerged in the later time 
window (400-600ms), suggesting that increasing age led to a longer time taken to disengage 
from the self-perspective to consider the character’s perspective. In the final 600-1000ms 
time window, this age modulation was no longer present. Importantly, these age-related 
changes were not as a result of domain-general cognitive changes, with no significant 
relationship to executive function abilities, suggesting a more domain-specific social-
cognitive decline in online ToM. This study demonstrates the importance of examining 
implicit ToM processes in healthy aging populations – including both adolescence, which is a 
period of rapid developmental change, and older aged adults – allowing further 
understanding of how ToM functions and develops across the lifespan to be established.  
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